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BOOK REVIEW

Enlightening Identity and Copyright
SHUBHA GHoSHt

I. IN WHICH THE AUTHOR ADDRESSES HIMSELF TO A NEW
BOOK AND OLD IDEAS

The Enlightenment, defined by the Oxford English
Dictionary as "the 18th c. philosophy emphasizing reason
and individualism over tradition," is often referred to as
the Age of Reason. Challenging this description of the
Enlightenment is Professor Emma Rothschild's new book,
Economic Sentiments,2 an in-depth and fresh discussion of
the thought of Adam Smith and Condorcet. Sentiments,
uncertainty, and concern for equality were, according to
Professor Rothschild, as much a concern for Smith and
Condorcet as order and reason. While much of what
Professor Rothschild says is not new, she presents
Enlightenment thought as offering possibilities for current
debates in copyright and identity politics.
Professor Rothschild's book comes in a recent line of
and popular works that reframe the
academic
Enlightenment. A new biography of Kant,3 several books

" Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York, University at
Buffalo Law School.
1. 5 OXTORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 268 (2d ed. 1989).
2. EMiA ROTHSCHILD, ECONOMIC SENTIMENTS (2001).

3. MANFRED KUEHN, KANT: A BIOGRAPHY (2001).
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representing the thought of the Founding Fathers,4 and a
remarkable fictional retelling of the conflict leading to the
drawing of the Mason-Dixon line5 are just a small part of
the growing canon on the Enlightenment to which
Economic
Sentiments
contributes.
But
Professor
Rothschild's book stands out in two ways. First, she has
made a useful contribution to the history of economic ideas,
synthesizing familiar materials and presenting them in a
new light. Second, she offers valuable insight into the
thought of two seminal Enlightenment figures: Adam
Smith, often thought of as the father of modern economics,
and Condorcet, the originator of a quantitative analysis of
politics.
Even if Professor Rothschild's book is part of a larger
trend to revisit the Enlightenment and remap its contours,
why should anyone concerned with law or with
jurisprudence care? After all, ideas have progressed since
the Enlightenment in ways that many Enlightenment
thinkers could not imagine. A concern with Enlightenment
thought may seem to some as infantile nostalgia- a search
for origins that distracts from more immediate problems.
But as Professor Rothschild points out, the twenty-first
century has much in common with the world inhabited by
Smith and Condorcet. "The political and economic thought
of the late eighteenth century," Professor Rothschild
contends, "the old, lost idyll of universal freedom-is itself,
now, newly familiar."
What the late eighteenth and incipient twenty-first
centuries have in common is a "sense of an unbounded
future."7 "Political institutions are more free of the fear of
revolution now than at any time in the nineteenth or
twentieth centuries. The rhetoric of the endlessness of
commerce is more unquestioned."8 But despite this
optimism, citizens of the twenty-first century are concerned
with "the endless uncertainty, the unquiet imagination,
which were believed, in the late eighteenth century, to be
4. E.g., JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY
GENERATION (2000); DAvID McCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS (2001); JACK N. RAKOVE,
ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION

(1997).
5. THOMAS PYNCHON, MASON & DIXON (1997).

6. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 2, at 6 (2001).
7. See id.
8.Id.
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the consequences of commercial freedom."9 Consequently,
according to Professor Rothschild, understanding late
eighteenth century thought can aid in understanding our
present context.10
To illustrate Professor Rothschild's points about the
parallels between the eighteenth and twenty-first centuries,
I provide two examples drawn from ongoing debates among
legal academics. My contention is that rethinking and
engaging the Enlightenment can aid in each of these
debates.
The first debate focuses on "romantic authorship"
among scholars of copyright law. Copyright law is premised
on the assumption of the "romantic author"-the lone
genius that creates valuable expression. Many scholars
have criticized this assumption without providing a
substitute. A substitute may be found in how
Enlightenment thinkers viewed labor and social relations.
The second is the ongoing debate between scholars of
law and economics and scholars of a more humanistic
persuasion, particularly those engaged in what I refer to
very broadly as "identity studies." With respect to the
debates percolating from "identity studies," the central
premise is one of the centrality of individual identity within
a group and the irreconcilability of passion and reason.
Seeing how Enlightenment thinkers attempted to reconcile
these issues may enliven and enrich the debate. I do not
believe that Enlightenment thought offers solutions; I do
think, with Professor Rothschild, that casting attention on
debates from the eighteenth century can aid in our
understanding of the twenty-first.
While I ultimately conclude that Professor Rothschild's
book does not offer satisfying solutions, her book is an
admirable start for future research. Put another way, in
this review, I not only offer some glimpse into the book
Economic Sentiments, I also play "Monday morning
quarterback" (or "Monday morning auteur") and describe
the hypothetical book that I wish had been written. But
before I present the book as I wish it had been composed,
let me attempt to do justice to Professor Rothschild's
accomplishment by condensing many of her key arguments
and conclusions.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 5-6.
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II. IN WHICH THE BOOK IS REPRESENTED AND, LET'S PRAY,
NOT DISTORTED

Professor Rothschild guides the reader through the
intricacies of Smith and Condorcet's writings and their
interplay with contemporary debates. Although the book
does not provide a thorough account of either author,
Economic Sentiments does demonstrate what the two
authors shared, and their shared elements serve as a
foundation for Rothschild's reconstruction of Enlightenment
thought. The views of Smith and Condorcet on
contemporary policy debates illustrate their common bond
and the depth of their thought on issues of individual
rights, markets, and distributive justice.
A. HighlightingFour Common Themes
Adam Smith is thought of as the father of modern
economics. His book The Wealth of Nations" provided a
detailed account of certain aspects of the English economy
and marked a separation of economics from moral
philosophy. In his equally famous The Theory of Moral
Sentiments," Smith developed an analysis of emotions that
was simultaneously unsentimental and cognizant of the
force of emotions in human life.
Condorcet did for politics what Smith did for economics.
His Esquisse d'un Tableau Historique des Progres de
L'Esprit Humaine" is a treatise on contemporary laws and
politics that is remembered largely for its discussion of the
deficiencies of voting mechanisms. The Condorcet paradox,
which demonstrates how majority voting can yield
inconsistent outcomes, is often cited as a sobering
and
of
the
pitfalls
of
democracy
illustration
majoritarianism.14 Condorcet, himself, died as a victim of
11. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., 1976).
12. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (D.D. Raphael & A.L.

Macfie eds., 1976).
13. CONDORCET, ESQUISSE D'uN TABLEAU HISTORIQUE DES PROGRES DE
L'EsPRIT HUMAIN (Yvon Belaval ed., 1970).

14. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at
Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism,and Democratic Politics, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 2121, 2129-30 (1990) (describing Condorcet paradox as a part of
criticism of its implications for democratic politics); Maxwell L. Stearns,
Standing Back from the Forest:Justiciabilityand Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV.
1309, 1329-50 (1995) (using Condorcet paradox as analytical tool).
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the Reign of Terror. Smith and Condorcet together
represent the dominance of reason and analysis over
emotions and intuition in understanding human affairs,
economic and political.
Smith and Condorcet's ideas intersect on four points,
according to Rothschild. 5 Both believed that economic
rights were coextensive with political rights. The liberal
distinction between personal and civil liberties and
economic rights, such as rights in property, would have
been foreign to both thinkers, as well as Enlightenment
thought more broadly.
Just as the line between the
political and economic was non-existent, so was the
distinction between reasoned economic calculus and
economic sentiments. The figure of homo economicus as a
character devoid of passion and emotion would have seemed
as empty and unintelligible to Smith and Condorcet as he
does to many readers of law and economics today. Passion
informed judgment and reason devoid of sentiment would
have been seen as one-dimensional and misguided.
Both Smith and Condorcet, however, also recognized
that passion could distort reason. The word that Rothschild
appeals to many times is "vexation"' 6 -the destructive uses
of passion to subvert order and to oppress others. The
curative for the vexatious use of the sentiments, according
to both Smith and Condorcet, is the creation of public
institutions, which serve to educate and enlighten all
citizens. Universal education was the key to restore the
balance between economic reason and economic sentiment.
But unlike many twentieth century thinkers, Smith and
Condorcet did not view the creation of public institutions as
a panacea. Both were aware of the limits of reason and the
role uncertainty played in subverting man's plan. The
universe of both Condorcet and Smith "is a place of
uncertainty and irresolution," 7 rooted in the diversity of
human beings and the battle within each individual among
countless passions and interests.
Such is Rothschild's portrait of the Enlightenment as
reflected in the thought of Smith and Condorcet. The
tandem of economics and politics, the interplay of emotions

15. See ROTHSCHILD, supra note 2, at 218-28.

16. The word is used so often by Rothschild that it has its own index entry,
with references to id. at 27-28, 33, 110-11, 165, 169, 262 n.100.
17. Id. at 228.
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and reason, the threat of vexation and the cure of public
education, and the underlying uncertainty and irresolution
are the four shared themes in the works of Smith and
Condorcet.
This portrait should not be surprising. It is a portrait
captured in Peter Gay's three-volume account of the
Enlightenment 8 and painted by Voltaire in his Candide, a
satire of rationalism and optimism that debunks the "best
of all possible worlds." 9 Many Enlightenment thinkers were
reacting to the political and intellectual despotism of
monarchy and church. The goal of being enlightened was to
cast light on the folly of deductive rationalism and
metaphysics that shadowed the realities of the world and of
society. When Voltaire ends Candide with the maxim about
cultivating one's garden," he would be in sympathy with
the Enlightenment canvas populated by Rothschild's
reading of Smith and Condorcet: the world is one full of
diverse reasons and passions in which the waves of
uncertainty and unpredictability are broken by public
institutions as fragile as the humans who made them.
Fragility, I think is the key word for Rothschild,
especially as she parallels the movement towards universal
commerce in the eighteenth century with today's trajectory.
What can be gleaned from Smith and Condorcet for twentyfirst century thinkers, politicians, lawyers, and policy
makers who stand in the wake of Capitalism's triumph?
Despite Smith and Condorcet's appeal to political
conservatives who find support in Smith for the triumph of
the "invisible hand" of the marketplace and in Condorcet for
the malleability and irrationality of political decision
making, their thought reveals two sides to the
Enlightenment, a "good Enlightenment" and a "bad
Enlightenment."2' The "good Enlightenment" is one "in
which commerce and liberty are interrelated in the
sentiments and opinions of individuals."22 In the "bad
Enlightenment," "individuals are imprisoned by their own
discontent, or by their own cupidity, in a society of

18. See, e.g., PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION, VOLUME

II: THE SCIENCE OF FREEDOM (1969).
19. VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE 2, 118 (photo. reprint 1999) (1759).
20. Id. at 149.
21. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 2, at 250.
22. Id.
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universal commerce."" The uncertainty of human passions
and reason creates the fragility by which the "good
Enlightenment" can degenerate into the bad. Conservative
thinkers that see in the Enlightenment only the possibility
of the good are just as guilty of the unbounded optimism of
the
deductive
rationalists
against
whom
many
Enlightenment thinkers were reacting.
But if all that Smith and Condorcet have to offer is the
idea that the world is uncertain and fragile-that we live in
a "fatherless world,"24 to use Professor Rothschild's
phrase-then what is the constructive use of their thought?
The two thinkers' contributions to the eighteenth century
political debates over famine relief and apprenticeship
illustrate the pragmatic and instrumental dimensions of
their work. Even more illuminating is Adam Smith's
conception of the "invisible hand," a favorite idea of political
conservatives in advocating unfettered markets. Smith's
view of the "invisible hand," as Rothschild aptly
demonstrates, was much more ironic and illustrates more
cogently what Rothschild sees as the virtues of the "good
Enlightenment."
B. Engaging and EnlighteningPolicy Debates
In three well-researched chapters, Professor Rothschild
documents the views of Smith and Condorcet on famine
relief and Smith's views on apprenticeships and the
invisible hand.25 Each chapter enhances our appreciation for
the depth of the two authors' writings and what Professor
Rothschild would describe as the "good Enlightenment."
First of all, Smith and Condorcet were opposed to
government regulation of the corn (or in the United States,
wheat) market. Their views, however, should be
distinguished from what we currently take as standard
"laissez-faire"
positions.
As
Professor
Rothschild
emphasizes, Smith "favored complete freedom in one
market, for corn" and "his support for free commerce in corn
was quite consistent with support of intervention in

23. Id.
24. Id. at 218.
25. See id. at 72-86 (ch. 3, Commerce and the State), 87-115 (ch. 4,
Apprenticeship and Insecurity), 116-56 (ch. 5, The Bloody and Invisible Hand).
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markets for labor, land rental, and public works."26
Condorcet's view was identical with Smith's on the issue of
free markets for corn. According to
Condorcet,
"[g]overnment owes relief to those who suffer... [by]
assuring a salary and work to the poor."2' Furthermore,
neither advocated an unregulated market for corn because
of an a priori faith in markets or fear of government. The
unregulated market for corn, accompanied by regulated
markets for labor, land rental, and public works, would
serve to avoid famines and the spread of misery among the
poor.
What distinguishes Smith and Condorcet's criticisms of
government regulation from analogous criticisms today
(such as of rent control or of the minimum wage) is
attention to institutional detail and the possibility of
disequilibrium in markets. Both Smith and Condorcet
understood the interactions among various markets and the
way in which institutions, such as the government, guilds
or town councils, shaped and modulated the operations of
markets. Their vision was neither an anarchical nor a
utopian one. Markets worked because of institutions and
they often failed because of institutions, a position far
removed from the standard neo-classical economic view of
markets as frictionless mechanisms for the voicing of
preferences and the earning of profits. Government
intervention could matter in more than a detrimental way.
Governments could create markets or cure them. Bad policy
arose from intervention in the wrong market through
improper means.
The care for institutional detail and concern with
disequilibrium are also reflected in Smith's analysis of the
apprentice and guild system, a method for structuring labor
markets and mobility that Smith absolutely detested. With
his analysis of the apprentice system, Smith turns to
private regulation, as opposed to government regulation.
Smith's suspicion of private cartels is well documented by
his oft quoted sentence: "People of the same trade seldom
meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in

26. Id. at 82-83.
27. Id. at 78.
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some contrivance to raise prices. " " Guilds posed problems
very similar to the secret cabals and conspiracy that Smith
condemned. They imposed barriers on social mobility and
entry into occupations and permitted the play of vexation
and passions as opposed to merit and talent. Many of
Smith's arguments are, of course, reminiscent of
conservative criticisms of modern labor unions and
government interventions in the marketplace. But Smith
was no proto-Lochnerian. He was in no way extolling an
early version of "freedom of contract." As is made clear from
Professor Rothschild's discussion of the debate over the corn
laws, Smith did value government intervention and did see
properly targeted government policy as necessary to
prevent the scourge of famines. Similarly, the elimination of
the guild system was necessary not to permit the
supremacy of contract but to promote a more equitable
distribution of income. Smith's concerns were with equity
and income distribution, a point overlooked by those who
take out of context his criticisms of market regulation and
government intervention.
The dissonance between Smith's writings and how he is
remembered is most striking in Professor Rothschild's
account of the "invisible hand," Smith's most famous and
most often cited idea. Smith used the term "invisible hand"
three times in his writing: once in a History of Astronomy,29
published posthumously, once in his Theory of Moral
Sentiments," published in 1759, and once in his Wealth of
Nations,* published in 1776. In each instance, Professor
Rothschild concludes, Smith was being ironic and sardonic.
In his History of Astronomy, for example, Smith was
making fun of the faith of members of primitive society in
the forces of nature which are attributed to the invisible
hand of gods and demons. In the Theory of Moral
Sentiments, Smith uses the phrase in describing
"unpleasant rich proprietors" who have no concern for
justice or humanity but pursue "their own vain and
insatiable desires" in employing and paying poor workers
"to produce luxurious commodities" and thus "are led by an
28. This famous statement from The Wealth of Nations is quoted and
commented upon in GAY, supranote 18, at 366.
29. Adam Smith, History of Astronomy, in ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHICAL
SUBJECTS 49-50 (W.P.D. Wrightman et al. eds., 1980).
30. SMITH, supranote 12, at 184-85.
31. SMITH, supranote 11, at 453, 456, 462,471.
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without knowing
invisible hand to... without intending it,
it, advance the interest of the society." 2 Finally, in The
Wealth of Nations, the invisible hand metaphor is used to
promote free international trade and challenge the tenets of
mercantilism.
The three uses of the invisible hand metaphor,
according to Rothschild, have been seen as illustrating an
evolution of Smith's thought on the benefits and grace of
free trade and unregulated commerce. 3 However, as
Rothschild points out, Smith made reference to the invisible
hand so sporadically and so ironically, it is not conceivable
that he advocated the faith in market systems and
unfettered freedom that many conservative thinkers would
like to believe. Instead, the invisible hand metaphor should
be understood in light of Smith's stoicism and belief in
natural religion, derived from the writings of David Hume.
What Smith did believe in was the underlying disorder of
the cosmos and the vagaries of individual human reason
and passion. Faith in the invisible hand, in the tendency
towards spontaneous order, was, for Smith, as naive and as
unsophisticated as the belief in the invisible hand of gods
and demons to cause floods and plagues. Order is not
spontaneous but can be, as in the free trade example, the
unintended consequence of individual self-interested action.
The response to a chaotic world is not faith in spontaneous
order but in the ability of individuals to temper their
passions and to avoid oppressive and vexatious conduct.
The invisible hand is irony, when seen against the visible
actions of even-tempered individuals.
Professor Rothschild's exegesis of Smith's view of the
invisible hand is the most controversial portion of the book.
A review in the Wall Street Journal contends that we have
come a long way from Adam Smith; and even if Adam
Smith may not have whole-heartedly believed in the
invisible hand and the attendant notion of freedom of
contract, the two hundred or so years of experience with
market economies, socialist systems, and government
regulation support a more libertarian reading of Smith's
words.34 Such a conscious politicization of Smith, however,
32. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 2, at 116-17.
33. See id. at 155-56.
34. Jerry Z. Muller, Great Minds, Imperfect Markets, WALL ST. J., June 21,
2001, at A16.
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does not address Rothschild's more compelling point. Smith
was a Stoic, not a Republican or "blue dog Democrat." His
conservatism reflected not only a doubt in the existence of
an underlying order to the universe but also a belief in the
ability of reason and even-temperedness to exorcise the
demons posed by the passions. Smith's stoicism, not an
inherent appeal to principle such as freedom of contract,
informed his view of policy and political-economy.
A more technical criticism of Professor Rothschild's
discussion of the invisible hand can be based on
developments
in
economic
theory
since
Smith.
Mathematical models, having roots in the simple supply
and demand models made popular by Alfred Marshall,
serve as tools to control and predict the direction of the
marketplace.35 The biggest development in economic theory
in the twentieth century has been the creation of a complete
and consistent model of market economies that would
describe how markets function. The construction of such a
model would either support socialist-style planning or serve
as a tool to understand the role of government policy and
the fluidity of market mechanisms. Such a model, called the
general equilibrium model, was developed in the 1950s by
Kenneth Arrow, Frank Hahn, and Gerard Debreu. 6 The
general equilibrium model, and the two welfare theorems
that are derived from the model, serve as the basis for
modern understandings of Smith's invisible hand.
Professor Rothschild briefly mentions Professors Arrow
and Hahn's description of Smith's idea of the invisible hand
as "poetic."" But for modern economic theory, the invisible
hand is not mere rhetoric. The general equilibrium model
allows economists to demonstrate that under certain
conditions market mechanisms can function smoothly and
consistently, without the intervention of a visible agent
such as the government or private cartels. Under similar
conditions, market mechanisms can guarantee efficient
results, known as the First Welfare Theorem; and under
additional conditions, any distributional outcome can be
reached through a market mechanism supported by the
appropriate distribution of initial resources, a result known
35. See MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 327-427 (1962).
36. See id. at 574-614.
37. See id. at 599-600.
38. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 2, at 122.
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as the Second Welfare Theorem. 9 The invisible hand rests
on technical, mathematical assumptions about the
structure of technology and individual preferences and
choice behavior. Furthermore, the visible hand of the
government, working through the redistribution of initial
resources, can aid in reaching any desired distributional
outcome by appropriate manipulation of markets. Whether
Rothschild is correct or not about Smith's true posture
towards the invisible hand, modem economic theory
provides a complete and consistent rendering of the
invisible hand and the power of the market mechanism.
Even if economic theory belies Smith's actual position,
the contrast between how modern economic theory has
viewed markets and how Smith viewed them is striking.
Highlighting this contrast is Rothschild's strongest
contribution, not only in her chapter on the invisible hand,
but also in her discussion of the corn laws and guilds. The
major contrast arises in differences in ends. General
equilibrium theory is concerned with establishing the
efficiency of markets. As has been emphasized, Smith was
primarily concerned with questions of equity and
distribution as well as the orderly functioning of markets.
Although general equilibrium theory can be used to analyze
issues of equity and distribution, questions of equity are
often placed outside the theory, as the domain of noneconomic fields. For Smith, as for Condorcet, questions of
efficiency and equity could not be separated. Means and
ends were intertwined as were the fields of politics and
economics.
The more subtle contrast between modern general
equilibrium theory and the thought of Smith (as well as of
Condorcet) is the role of institutions." Rothschild's chapters
on the corn laws and guilds illustrate how sensitive Smith
and Condorcet were to the institutional context of markets.
39. See DONALD E. CAMPBELL, RESOURCE ALLOCATION MECHANISMS 42-47
(1987).
40. See R.H. COASE, The InstitutionalStructure of Production, in ESSAYS ON
ECONOMICS AND ECONOMISTS 3-14 (1994) (discussing the institutional
dimensions of markets); see also Richard Posner, Nobel Laureate:Ronald Coase
and Methodology, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 195, 206 (1993) (In discussing current
methodological debates in economics, Posner noted that, "for [Coase], the value
of Smith's 'invisible hand' is that it directs our attention to visible phenomena,
namely economic practices and institutions that can be observed, described,
compared.").
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Markets are not spontaneous creations; the creation of
markets was a problem of institutional design and
planning. The technical precision of general equilibrium
theory makes it difficult to understand outside of
equilibrium behavior. Questions of historical transition and
development are impossible to analyze within general
equilibrium theory and as a result are often dismissed as
uninteresting because unanswerable. Smith and, even more
so, Condorcet were attuned to disequilibrium behavior and
the subtle interactions across markets as they responded to
policy and changes in the social and political environment.
For twenty-first century economists and law and economics
scholars who are more institution-minded than efficiencyminded, a return to the roots of Smith and Condorcet
provides an antidote to the limitations of general
equilibrium theory, whose influence on contemporary policy
making and law has been profound, even if invisible.
There is a story, perhaps apocryphal, among economists
about Paul Samuelson and Milton Friedman, two renowned
economists-Samuelson representing the liberal end of the
specturm and Friedman the conservative end. At a
conference, after Professor Friedman presented a paper
highly critical of government policies that intervened and
upset the natural order and balance of the marketplace,
Professor Samuelson commented, "Milton, I wish I were as
certain of anything as you are of everything." Samuelson's
view, at one level, is the one more consistent with the
supposedly conservative Smith and Condorcet, at least as
Rothschild presents them. For Smith and Condorcet, the
world was an uncertain place, a "fatherless world." As a
result, both were very subtle and tempered in their
judgments, closely analyzing the world as it is without
resort to some rational, universal model. Ironically, their
method contrasts sharply with that of Professor Samuelson,
the pioneer in mathematical models of the marketplace.
Smith and Condorcet were, first of all, empiricistsskeptical in judgments, suspicious of principle. Is it possible
to find such a balance today? Professor Rothschild's hope is
that such a combination of cautious method and concern
with distribution is possible in today's world-one that, like
Smith and Condorcet's universe, is threatened by universal
commerce and the "bad Enlightenment."
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C. Discerningthe Enlightenment at the End of the Tunnel?
At the simplest level, the lesson to be drawn from
Professor Rothschild's book is that the current claim by
political conservatives that Smith and Condorcet are one of
their own is incorrect. Her dissection of Smith and
Condorcet's thoughts is meant to illustrate the disjunction
between modern ideas and Enlightenment ideas about the
marketplace and regulation. In fact, this simple point is
made clear at the outset: the second chapter of the book is
entitled "Smith and Conservative Economics" and
demonstrates how both richer and subtler Adam Smith is
than most conservatives would admit.
But if Smith and Condorcet do not clearly belong to the
conservatives, should liberals or leftists stake a claim to
their work? Or are Smith and Condorcet simply irrelevant
to any current debate? These are the questions that
Professor Rothschild leaves unanswered. After all, for those
of us interested in the power of law to create institutions
that promote democracy, equality, and access, there are
more compelling thinkers than Smith and Condorcet to cite
and espouse.
I wish Professor Rothschild had addressed these
questions. Instead, she provides a juxtaposition of a good
Enlightenment and a bad Enlightenment, concluding with
an admonition against the latter and an endorsement of the
former. Her concern is with the dangers of universal
commerce, but she ignores the current debate over
commodification that has been enriched by feminist legal
theorists such as Margaret Jane Radin. There is no
discussion of the doux commerce thesis (except for a passing
reference)42 and its implications for globalization-issues
resuscitated by Professor Jerome Reichmann in his work
discussing TRIPS.43 There is a missing half to Professor
Rothschild's book. Perhaps she will write it. Perhaps
someone else will.
41. See

MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMIODITIES

(1996).

42. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 2, at 37 (referring to Albert 0. Hirschman, THE
PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS

TRIUMPH (1977)).

43. Jerome H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging
Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 23-54
(Rochelle Cooper et al. eds., 2001).
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What I propose in the remainder of this review is
possible content for such a book. Such "Monday morning
quarterbacking" may seem inappropriate and disrespectful.
I mean no disrespect. Quite the contrary, I simply would
like to explore for the patient reader the possibilities of
Professor Rothschild's stimulating ideas and the broader
reasons to entertain and reconsider Enlightenment
thought. I turn then to two current debates-one over
romantic authorship, the other over identity politics-to
crystallize these possibilities.
III. IN WHICH THE READER IS SHOWN A POSSIBLE
ALTERNATIVE TO ROMANTIc NOTIONS OF AUTHORSHIP AND
IDENTITY
Despite the parallels Rothschild draws between the
eighteenth and twenty-first centuries, our world would look
alien to Smith and Condorcet. Certainly they would
recognize the issues raised by the expansion of markets and
universal commerce, but they would also certainly be
surprised by the pervasive values of diversity, pluralism,
and tolerance of individual differences that has taken hold
since (and perhaps despite) the Enlightenment. Smith and
Condorcet would recognize the various arguments about
individual freedom versus social and state regulation, but
they may be taken aback at how the discussion of rights has
expanded and at the enlarged domain of rights now
recognizing non-whites and non-males as persons capable of
having protected rights. Over two hundred years of history
created a chasm between our world and the one that
Professor Rothschild explores.
But Enlightenment thought is still of value and should
not be simply archived and forgotten. Voices critical of legal
doctrine and theory are often reacting to the errors created
by counter-Enlightenment ideas, ones antithetical to the
skepticism and tentativeness illustrated by Smith and
Condorcet. In this section, I will illustrate this point and
the potential value of rethinking the Enlightenment with
reference to two debates: the first concerning "romantic
authorship" in copyright law and the second over identity
politics.
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A. Making Light of Romantic Authorship
Copyright law regulates the production, publication,
and distribution of expressive works, from novels to films,
from software to architectural works. Modern copyright law
has its roots in the Statute of Anne, enacted by Parliament
in 1709. 44 The statute was a major challenge to the power of
stationer's guilds, who traditionally had obtained the grant
to control publication of literary works from the monarch.
By shifting ownership and control to the authors of literary
works, the Statute of Anne established the notion that
authors have rights to control their creative works and are
not subject to the dictate of publishers.
The protection of authors also informs United States
copyright law. Congress has the exclusive authority under
the Constitution to secure the rights of authors in their
writings. 45 There have been several copyright statutes in
U.S. history, going back to copyright acts passed by various
colonies. The current act, the Copyright Act of 1976, 4
grants certain exclusive rights to the authors of original
works of expression fixed in a tangible medium. These
exclusive rights are limited principally by the doctrine of
fair use, a statutory provision that permits through
judicially
administered
standards
such
uses
as
photocopying for educational purposes, parodies, and
criticism. Current copyright law through fair use serves to
balance private, authorial rights and public uses.
Two controversies currently the subject of copyright law
illustrate the notion of romantic authorship. The first has to
do with originality; the second with fair use in digital
media. Copyright law protects original works of authorship,
but the term "original" is not defined statutorily. Judicial
glosses on the word are based on the idea of romantic
authorship. Courts have repeatedly stated that they are not
in the business of making aesthetic judgments about the
merits of a work. "Original" does not mean that a work is
especially
meritorious
or
high-brow
or
unique.
Advertisement and pornography are accorded as much
copyright protection as sculptures and the Great American
44. See 9 THE STATUTES

OF THE REALM 256 (1963).
45. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 8.
46. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§
101 et seq.).
47. See 17 U.S.C. §107 (1994).
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Novel. The word "originality" simply means that the person
who is claiming copyright in a work either created the work
or obtained the copyright through assignment or transfer
from the person who created the work. Originality is used
in the sense of "originated," and works of expression
originate from some human creator, regardless of the
merits of the expression.
The problem for courts is that not all works can obtain
copyright protection. Some things are so trivial that they
would seem to be outside the scope of copyright protection.
A list of what Salinger intends to buy at the grocery store is
a work of expression, but it seems odd to accord it the same
protection as Frannieand Zooey.48 Or to take a more salient
example, can I obtain a copyright in the Mona Lisa, a work
that no one can claim a copyright in because it is in the
public domain, by simply copying it in every detail on a
canvas? My actions are a form of expression and my work,
albeit a copy, is a work of expression created by me. But it
seems strange for me to create a copyright in this way.49
A final example, illustrating the commercial dimension
of copyright, exemplifies another dimension of the problem.
Suppose I form a business whose purpose is to produce and
distribute data bases, lists of names and addresses and
trivia that I painstakingly collect and organize. Do I have a
copyright in these databases or are my works simply
elaborate lists no different from Salinger's grocery list?
The Supreme Court, in a seminal decision from the
early nineties, ruled that not all works of expression are
equal." Original did not simply mean that the work
originated or was created by someone. Instead, original also
had to mean creative in order to avoid extending copyright
protection to everything created under the sun, no matter
how trivial. The question of whether a work was creative
enough to be original was not an aesthetic judgment.
Instead, creativity was a question of the kind of effort that
the author put into his expressions. A mere listing of data is
not adequately creative for copyright protection. Neither is
48. Even though Salinger's shopping list has not been found to be
copyrightable, his unpublished letters are copyright-protected. See Salinger v.
Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1987).
49. For a case where photographic copies of public domain artwork captured
on a CD-ROM were found not to be copyrightable, see Bridgeman Art Library
Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
50. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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mere copying. Both are the result of "sweat of the brow,"
and mere sweat is not enough to establish creativity and
gain copyright protection. Copyright protection is accorded
to the products of "intellectual production," to borrow a
phrase from an 1884 U.S. Supreme Court case holding that
the photographs of Oscar Wilde were copyrightable. ° The
product of mere physical efforts or mechanical reproduction
cannot be copyrighted.
As many scholars have pointed out, the Supreme
Court's ruling on originality in the Feist decision illustrates
an acceptance of the idea of the romantic author.52 Works of
expression are the products of creative genius, and
copyright protection is needed to secure the rights of works
of genius. The need for protection is often phrased in
pecuniary terms, but even if the desire for profits does not
motivate geniuses, copyright protection is needed to
preserve the integrity of authors and their efforts. Works
that are not the product of the romantic author do not
require copyright protection. The corollary to the
proposition that copyright protection serves to protect the
romantic author is that the romantic author should have
control over her works, with some limitations for fair use.
In copyright law, the romantic author is linked with the
creative entrepreneur. Both are individualistic, both are
engaged in more than physical labor in order to innovate
and bring new products to the world, and both are accorded
strong rights in their creations through copyright law.
The link between the romantic author and the
industrious entrepreneur has important implications for
fair use, especially with the development of digital media,
which permits the creation and dissemination of works of
expression instantaneously. More troubling for copyright
law is the ability to use digital media to unbundle and
reshape existing creative works. Musical compositions

51. See Borrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884).
52. See MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS 128, 135 (1993) (describing the
use of personality as a basis for property protection under copyright); see also
JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, & SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF

THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 41,

51, 159-161 (1996) (discussing the history of the

concept of authorship and its relationship to the construction of self-interest);
ROSEMARY COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES:
AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 211-12, 219-20 (1998) (discussing

romantic authorship); Mark Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of
Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1997).
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through digitization can be sampled and rearranged. Songs
bundled in compact disks can be unbundled and consumed
individually. The power of digitization affects not only
music, but also literary expression, photographs, and visual
media. Creation is a process of taking bits and pieces of
works and reconstructing them. Digitization makes this
possible and also makes us realize that perhaps creation
has always been a process of borrowing and reworking.
The figure of the romantic author can be a hindrance to
the democratic push of digital media. If the romantic author
through copyright law is given nearly absolute control over
her work, then users of digital media can be legally
enjoined from the most productive uses of the media. This
conflict is precisely at issue in many of the current cases,
the most prominent one being the dispute over Napster, in
which various owners of copyright in songs successfully
challenged a mechanism for the digital download of music
created by Shawn Fannin. 3 On the one hand, the case
involved the conflict over business interests that were
losing revenue because of the alternative distribution
mechanism and consumer interest in the practice of music
sharing, which had been occurring since the creation of the
tape recorder and which was being magnified by the digital
media. Framed this way it may be difficult to see why the
interests of the romantic author should trump those of the
consumer/user/reader, especially when the copyright
owners are not creative geniuses but corporate entities such
as recording companies. The dispute could also be framed
as a clash between two romantic authors, the creators of
music versus the creator of an ingenious, innovative system
for distributing and sharing music. Is one less creative than
the other? Is one less the example of intellectual labor and
creative effort? Can one answer these questions within the
theory of romantic authorship without resort to aesthetic or
other judgments?
The shaping of copyright law around the idea of
romantic authorship has been criticized as being both
limiting and limited, limiting because of its adverse effect
on practices such as music sharing, limited because of its
narrow individualistic rendering of the creative process. Yet
no one has adequately proposed an alternative foundation;
much of the criticism has proposed doctrinal tinkering to
53. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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cure some of the negative policy implications of romantic
authorship. 4 I propose that a reconsideration of some
aspects of Enlightenment thought may be useful to create
an alternative foundation. Since romantic authorship has
its roots in Romantic thought, much of which was a reaction
to the Enlightenment, perhaps the problems with the
romantic authorship framework rest in the rejection of
certain Enlightenment notions. But what is it about
Enlightenment thought that could serve as kindling for the
creative fires needed to purge the romantic author?
Very few Enlightenment thinkers addressed the
question of copyright law. Adam Smith did include a brief
passage in The Wealth of Nations on copyright and book
publishing as an example of fixed costs.55 Despite this lack
of attention, the Enlightenment provides an alternative to
the romantic authorship framework as a means of
conceptualizing
the parameters
of copyright law.
Enlightenment thought, with its focus on individual reason
and passion, was very much concerned with society and the
institutions in which individuals functioned. Romantic
authorship, on the other hand, is anti-social in many ways,
viewing the author as the genius who challenges social
conventions and thereby ensures social progress. Copyright
law, when seen through the lens of romantic authorship, is
a means of protecting authorial personality by giving the
author strong proprietary rights in her creative works.
Ironically, the theory of romantic authorship leads
copyright law to be a means of protecting entrepreneurial,
market-oriented activities. The romantic author and the
capitalist entrepreneur are flip sides of each other. It is
through this twist that entities like the Recording Industry
Association of America serve the role of protected author
under copyright law even though their copyrights were
obtained through contract rather than creative effort that is
associated with romantic authorship. Providing a basis for
54. Mark Lemley criticizes the romantic authorship model for not paying
adequate attention to the economic issues raised by intellectual property. By
appealing to economics, he proposes one possible alternative to the romantic
authorship approach. However, given the connection between romantic
authorship and the construction of self-interest, as discussed by Boyle, an
appeal to economic theory, especially neo-classical theory, may not be an
alternative to the theory of romantic authorship. See Lemley, supra note 52, at
882-83; BOYLE, supra note 52, at 159.
55. S HT, supra note 11, at 754.
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copyright law in Enlightenment, as opposed to Romantic,
thought can be a curative for some of the current criticisms
of copyright law.
What would an Enlightenment-informed (dare I say,
Enlightened?) copyright law look like? It would be a body of
law that recognizes the social dimensions of creativity as a
process of borrowing as opposed to a series of radical breaks
from the past. The analysis of copyright law issues would be
grounded less in questions of individual ownership and
control and more on the institutional dimensions of
ownership and control. The historical roots of copyright law
in the Statute of Anne would gather more salience not as a
symbol of the victory of the author, but as a means of
challenging the political and market control granted to the
stationer's guild and publishers. The Statute of Anne, as I
am sure Smith and Condorcet would gladly note,
undermined the vexatiousness of a guild and replaced a
system of privilege with one of individual merit and labor.
Smith and Condorcet, I contend, would have been equally
suspicious of current protection accorded to the music
industry under copyright law through the guise of
rewarding the romantic author. Sensitivity to institutional
detail and context, as opposed to protection of the
individual, would be the hallmark of an Enlightenmentinformed copyright law.
Current U.S. copyright law is viewed as a branch of
property law that serves to protect the property rights of
authors and creators. Ownership and control are its
bulwarks. Furthermore, these property rights are viewed as
nearly absolute and plenary. As Professor Rothschild points
out, Enlightenment thinkers were aware of shifts in what
constitutes property, especially in the unstable world of
commerce: "The new world of commerce was insecure...
because it was subject to frequent and other sudden
changes in laws, regulations, and the jurisprudence of
property."" Rothschild isolates four types of property that
was emerging during the Eighteenth Century, as
documented in part by Smith and Condorcet: property
rights in land, property rights in industry, property rights
in government taxes and expenditures, and the nascent
idea of property rights in the fruits of one's labor (the last
being of course the closest to our conception of copyright).
56. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 2, at 240.
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None of these types of property were viewed as fixed or nonmalleable. Each was subject to change with the winds of
commerce. Rights were important, but tentative, in the
Enlightenment world-a means more than an end. The goal
was social and market exchange and the promotion of
human activity. Such tentativeness and concern for social,
as opposed to individual, values could be the most valuable
contribution that Enlightenment thought could make to our
current understandings of copyright law.
B. Casting Light on Economic Man, Literary Women, and
Other Fragmentsof Identity
By identity studies, I mean, very loosely, feminist
theory and critical race theory and all its variants, such as
Lat-Crit, Asian American Studies, gender studies, etc. I am
principally concerned with the following shared beliefs of
these various schools: individual cultural, racial, ethnic,
and gendered identity matters for the structure of legal
institutions. The goal is to empower traditionally oppressed
and subordinated group identities.
This issue seems quite distant from that of intellectual
property, the other topic of this section. But as several
authors have pointed out, there is a common problem
running through both intellectual property and identity
studies. Professor Madhavi Sunder described the connection
succinctly as a parallel between IP (intellectual property)
and IP (identity politics).57 The parallel can be expressed in
another way. Just as the current trend in intellectual
property is to turn culture into property by making
proprietary the various artifacts of culture, so a current
trend in identity studies is to turn identity into an
inalienable property right vested in members of a particular
cultural, racial, ethnic or gendered group. Culture and
identity through legal discourse are being privatized.
It perhaps seems bizarre for me to contend that
somehow the Enlightenment can provide any support for
identity studies. The hierarchical, expressly racist
assumptions of many Enlightenment thinkers are the
subject of attack within identity studies. These assumptions
are well documented, and the reader is advised to look at
57. See Madhavi Sunder, Intellectual Property and Identity Politics:Playing
with Fire,4 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 69 (2000).
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Professor Emmanual Chukwudi Eze's Race and the
Enlightenment, an anthology of writings that illustrate the
Eurocentric positions of David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and
others." Even though Enlightenment thought is often
associated with universalism, the idea that we are all
united as members of the human species, it is also clear
that many Enlightenment thinkers had clear views on who
counted as a member of the human species. Identity studies
is not so much anti-universalist, as motivated by clarifying
the racial, cultural, ethnic, and gender dimensions of
human beings. The battle lines seem clear, and the
Enlightenment is on the other side. How can
Enlightenment thought inform identity studies?
The answer to this question rests on the parallel
between intellectual property and identity politics drawn
above. Copyright law, as currently structured in the United
States, has become increasingly privatized and shaped by
the idea of the "romantic author"--the heroic individual
that transcends social convention and brings new creations
into the world. Despite the on-the-surface communitarian
leanings of identity studies, much of the ideas are informed
by equally Romantic notions. Individual identity is often an
expression of one's will, an affirmation of private
association with a specific group. Identity politics is often a
matter of individual associational rights-the corporate
entity, although ostensibly communitarian, serving as an
extension or agent for individuals. The affirmation of
identity and association is a means of empowering the
individual, to ensure that the non-white, non-male
individual has as much power as the white, European male.
Identity becomes as proprietary under the various guises of
identity studies as culture does under copyright law (and as
many would contend intellectual property law, more
broadly).
Amartya Sen, the person to whom Professor Rothschild
dedicates her book, addresses some of the difficulties with
identity studies and identity politics in a recent essay in
The New Republic.59 Professor Sen does not deny that
identity is important in understanding the shape and
contours of social institutions and law. But he is also
58. RACE AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT: A READER 1-9 (Emanuel Chukvudi Eze
ed., 1997) [hereinafter RACE AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT].
59. Amartya Sen, Other People, NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 18, 2000, at 23-30.
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cautious about some of the negative implications of identity
politics, especially the possibility of "confounding our
relations with other people."" Identity can serve as a
barrier to valuable interaction and exchange, and Professor
Sen cites David Hume for "the importance of increased
intercourse in expanding the reach of our sense ofjustice."6 '
According to Sen, three ideas are often ignored by
identity politics: plural identities, identity choice, and
issues beyond identity. The idea of plural identities
illustrates the involvement of individuals in multiple
groups and the conflicts that may arise from such multiple
associations. Professor Sen's point is not that plural
identities should be avoided, but they exist as an empirical
fact and identity politics ignores them and attempts to
supplant them with unilateral loyalties to one group. Plural
identities are useful to the promotion of the type of
intercourse that can expand notions of justice. The fact of
plural identities also underscores the idea of identity choice.
Practitioners of identity politics have portrayed identity as
a matter of self-realization, as opposed to choice; identity is
inherent in the person waiting to be discovered and
secured. However, according to Sen, identity is a matter of
choice, a decision of association that does not arise solely
from the expression of will or the search for empowerment.
When framed as a matter of choice, identity association is
no different from other forms of association, such as
belonging to a corporate body or espousing some social or
political interest. As Professor Sen concludes, "It is
essential to recognize not only that identities can be plural,
and that the priorities we assign to our different identities
are a matter for us to decide, but also that moral and
political inclusion transcends the domain of identity." 62
Despite the views of Enlightenment thinkers on race
and gender, the attitude of the Enlightenment can do much
to strengthen the goals of identity studies. If, as Professor
Rothschild repeatedly indicates, the central belief of the
good Enlightenment was skepticism and doubt, then the
same skeptical mind-set should be focused on claims of
racial superiority and the proprietary notion of identity.
Skepticism should also be applied to claims that identity
60. Id. at 27.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 30.
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does not matter and that we live in a color-blind or genderneutral world. Identity is not an absolute principle, and like
authorship, it has a social dimension. The disturbing
assumptions about race and gender held by many
Enlightenment thinkers should not detract from their
method, which can serve to enrich current discussions of
identity.
The subtleties of the Enlightenment are illustrated by a
debate over race between Imanuel Kant and Johann
Gottfried Herder, documented by Professor Eze in his Race
63
and the Enlightenment.
In reviewing Herder's book, Ideas on the Philosophy of
the History of Mankind, Kant was critical of Herder's
method that, according to Kant, assumed there was a truth
to history waiting to be uncovered. Kant was also critical of
Herder's cultural pluralism, and unlike Herder, believed
that classification of individuals based on skin color was
sound. Neither side to this debate may be compelling to
current thinkers of identity issues: Kant espouses the
superiority of European white males and Herder concludes
that blacks Africans belonged in Africa. But the debate is
worth noting as evidence of the diverse views of race that
existed during the Enlightenment. Even more compelling is
the confusion and the uncertainty that the power of
skepticism and reason brought to understanding cultural
diversity. The "fatherless world," as described by Professor
Rothschild, does not support any categories or principles of
superiority and hierarchy. At the same time, identity and
diversity are empirical facts that social institutions must
contend with. A fatherless world is not a balkanized world,
nor is it a color-blind or gender-neutral one.
IV. IN WHICH THE AUTHOR TIGHTENS SOME LOOSE ENDS AND
LOOSENS SOME TIGHT ONES

I wrote the first draft of this review in early August. I
received the edits after September 11, 2001. That day's
events, in my mind, seemingly belie Professor Rothschild's
claim that the twenty-first century, like the eighteenth, is
filled with a "sense of an unbounded future." The
annihilation of the World Trade Center and the attempted
destruction of the Pentagon symbolize attacks on the foci of
63. RACE AND THE ENLIGHTENMUENT, supranote 58, at 65.
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Economic Sentiments: economics and politics. The surprise
of the attack and its devastation illustrate the uncertainty
inherent in an ordered world of commerce and politics as
well as the violence engendered in reactions to
Enlightenment thought and institutions. Recognizing this
uncertainty perhaps is a curative to the various reactions to
the tragedy of September 11, such as the supposed
rationality of racial profiling or the emergence of more
jingoistic military tactics.
One, now perhaps naive, notion informed my decision to
review Professor Rothschild's book: the notion that ideas
matter. The calculated violence of September 11 and the
contemporary desire for pragmatism and practicality may
make my notion misguided. But I finished Professor
Rothschild's book recognizing that the balance between
ideas and practice and between theory and fact is the
hallmark of Smith and Condorcet's works, and perhaps the
greatest contribution of the Enlightenment. Neither Smith
nor Condorcet were naive believers in the power of reason
or practitioners of a dismal science. They were sensitive to
institutions and history and the context in which markets
and commerce operated. It is clear from Professor
Rothschild's book that their work is not wholly consonant
with current conservative agenda of universal commerce
and commodification. The more difficult question is
whether Smith and Condorcet are relevant to liberal or
leftist institutional building and legal reform. I have
suggested some points of relevance. Future research, I
hope, will expand on these points by following the lead of
Professor Rothschild's insightful and stimulating book.

